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17 August 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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Iran: Prime Minister Amini is planning to organize a "spontaneous" pro-Shah demonstration on 19 August, the anniversary of the overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953. He believes that a demonstration of loyalty to the Shah and the monarchy is particularly important in light of the current Soviet propaganda attacks against the Shah. The anniversary is observed every year but normally is a colorless, pro forma expression of loyalty, mostly by government officials. The antigovernment National Front has so far shown no indications of planning a countermove, and most security officials appear confident of keeping the situation under control.

OK

Amini has also told the US ambassador in Tehran that he is confident he can successfully prosecute corruption cases now pending against several former high officials, despite the Shah's reluctance to see the trials proceed. The Shah apparently fears that officials now close to the palace will be implicated in the proceedings. Amini said one of the trials would start next week. Successful prosecutions would do much to improve the public image of Amini, who has been accused of

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giving in to the Shah and becoming the same ineffective mouth-piece as former prime ministers. Amini continues to temporize on elections and hopes to delay them until his programs can show results.

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Northern Rhodesia: British reports indicate that the disorders in Northern Rhodesia are still widespread but not out of control. The Africans in the protectorate apparently remain adamant in their opposition to the British constitutional proposals, which would allow increased African representation in the legislature but would not satisfy native demands. Kenneth Kaunda, the moderate president of the United National Independence party, recently told an American official that he had lost control of his African followers, who want more drastic action against the whites. British officials in London have indicated that they appreciate the value of Kaunda's moderating influence, but they assert that any concessions to him will be made difficult by opposition of the conservative whites, led by federal Prime Minister Welensky. [redacted]

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[redacted]
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Bolivia: A general strike began in Cochabamba, Bolivia's second largest city, on 15 August in protest against the continued imprisonment of about thirty Communist labor leaders. Two persons are reported to have been killed and others injured in clashes between strikers and the police yesterday. Protest strikes are also threatened in La Paz and in the mining center of Oruro, and the Senate has passed a recommendation urging immediate release of the prisoners.

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President Paz has stated that he will not release the prisoners during the 90-day state-of-siege which began 7 June. He apparently hoped that the "triangular operation," a rehabilitation program for the mines which is backed by the Inter-American Development Bank and the governments of the United States and West Germany, could be launched during this period. Refusal of labor leaders in the mines to relinquish their voice in mine management is contributing to delay of the rehabilitation plan.

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

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[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:]

No

[No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.]

[We have no evidence of any significant or abrupt change in the Soviet military posture in the direction of increased readiness for general hostilities.]

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but the USSR is continuing its efforts to improve its military capability. We have no evidence of a redirection of the civil sectors of the USSR toward mobilization.

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The Situation in Northern Rhodesia

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[The British, although they believe the situation in Northern Rhodesia is "quieting down," nevertheless feel that there are many uncertainties in the situation which could lead to a further flare-up of the violence and sabotage which have been occurring in the protectorate for nearly two weeks. According to a British Embassy official in Washington, London hopes to solve the problem by a combination of vigorous police action and behind-the-scenes constitutional talks. American Embassy officers in London were informed that the Colonial Office expected Kaunda to make some approach during his flying visit to London earlier this week, and the British indicated that further political negotiations could not be ruled out after order had been restored.]

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[London's maneuverability is limited, however. The extremely complex constitutional proposals were accepted by Federal Prime Minister Welensky's United Federal party (UFP) only after Britain made last-minute changes which reduced the possibility that African nationalists might dominate the legislature; UFP spokesmen in Northern Rhodesia have refused to consider any further modification. The British apparently are reluctant to force any changes against the will of the whites for fear that favorable trends among the far more conservative Europeans in Southern Rhodesia will be reversed. In addition, London probably fears that to yield to the demands of one party will eventually lead to a renegotiation of the entire constitution.]

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[The demands made by Kaunda in London--involving the restoration of Asians and mulattoes to the common roll and a reduction in the percentage of votes required for election--would be difficult for either London or Salisbury to accept. However, particularly in view of the success of Hastings Banda's Malawi Congress party in the 15 August elections in neighboring Nyasaland, it is questionable whether Kaunda and his United National Independence party (UNIP) will be satisfied with anything less than a reasonable assurance of African domination in the legislature. Banda, who will control 22 of the 28 seats]

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In the Nyasaland legislature and will have at least three portfolios in the eight-member executive council (Cabinet), has urged Kaunda to take a more extreme line. Unless Kaunda can show substantial results for his relatively moderate approach, extremists probably will begin to exert greater influence within UNIP.

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